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Yelp Inc.1 respectfully submits this Answer to the Amicus Briefs 
filed in this matter.  As Yelp demonstrates below, the Amicus Brief of 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Valencia Corridor Merchants Association, Derik 
Lewis, Aaron Morris and Henry Karnilowicz (the “Chemerinsky Amicus 
Brief” of the “Chemerinsky Amici”) gives this Court no reason to affirm 
the appellate Opinion, and in fact further exposes the many fundamental 
flaws in that Opinion.  For the reasons explained in the Briefs on the Merits 
and below, Yelp respectfully requests that the Court reverse the decision of 
the Court of Appeal, and remand this matter with instructions to the trial 
court to grant Yelp’s Motion to Vacate the Judgment.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The dearth of amicus support for Plaintiffs’ arguments attests to the 
emptiness of those arguments.  The key premise underlying the 
Chemerinsky Amicus Brief, the sole Amicus Brief submitted to support 
Plaintiffs, is simply wrong—that injunctive relief against Internet 
publishers is the only remedy available to those who allegedly have been 
defamed by online speech.  E.g., Brief at 1, 2.  As this Court recognized in 
                                              
1 Along with Yelp’s related websites and mobile applications, Non-
Party Appellant Yelp Inc. is referred to simply as “Yelp” in this Brief. 
Plaintiffs Dawn L. Hassell and the Hassell Law Group are referred 
to collectively as “Hassell” or “Plaintiffs.” 
2 The caption page of the Chemerinsky Amicus Brief mistakenly 
identifies Yelp as the “Defendant and Appellant” in this matter, while 
omitting reference to the actual Defendant, Ava Bird.  Yelp is the non-party 
Appellant in this matter. 
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Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 63, disgruntled plaintiffs can sue 
the original speaker directly, as Plaintiffs did here; if they satisfy the 
constitutional requirements, they can obtain a judgment and injunction 
against that individual.  That injunction then can be enforced against the 
defendant through the panoply of remedies available under California law.  
Plaintiffs, however, have never tried to enforce their Judgment against 
Defendant Ava Bird (“Bird”).  Thus, even if Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230) (“Section 230”) permitted 
a remedy against Internet publishers in the rare case in which an injunction 
against the speaker is ineffective—although it does not—speculation by 
Plaintiffs and the Chemerinsky Amici about untried enforcement attempts 
against Bird could not possibly meet the test they ask this Court to create 
out of whole cloth.  Section II.A, infra. 
The Chemerinsky Amici also misconstrue the First Amendment and 
case law in urging this Court to give its blessing to a prior restraint entered 
against Yelp without any notice or opportunity to be heard.  Indeed, Dean 
Chemerinsky’s prior arguments to this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court 
regarding the necessary limits on prior restraints demonstrate the fallacy of 
their claims.  As Yelp’s merits Briefs explain, this Court’s decision in 
Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, permitted 
a narrow injunction following a contested trial on the merits, against the 
defendant alone.  O.B. 32 and R.B. 23, citing 40 Cal.4th at 1155-56, 1158, 
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1160.  Like Plaintiffs, the Chemerinsky Amici cannot cite a single case 
supporting their proposed rewrite of the law governing prior restraints, and 
so they invoke a handful of arguments that Yelp already has refuted.  The 
Chemerinsky Amici cannot defend the prior restraint entered against Yelp, 
and the appellate Opinion should be reversed.  Section II.B, infra. 
II. THE CHEMERINSKY AMICUS BRIEF OVERLOOKS KEY 
FACTS AND THE GOVERNING LAW 
A. Defamation Plaintiffs Already Have Adequate Remedies 
For Allegedly Defamatory Internet Speech. 
The Chemerinsky Amici insist that this Court must rewrite due 
process law to permit direct actions against Internet providers—in the guise 
of “takedown orders”—in order to ensure that Internet defamation plaintiffs 
have a meaningful remedy.  Brief at 1, 2, 8.  They warn ominously that “[i]f 
Yelp’s argument were to prevail, the Internet would continue to descend 
into an uncontrolled and uncontrollable wasteland of defamatory content, 
threats, harassment, and non-consensually posted private sex videos.”  Brief 
at 10 (emphasis added).  But defamation plaintiffs have many remedies 
available if they choose to pursue them (which Plaintiffs did not do here). 
For example, as discussed in the Opening Brief (at 7) and Reply 
Brief (at 33), the Chemerinsky Amici’s concerns about enforcing a 
defamation injunction are overblown and speculative.  The Chemerinsky 
Amici speculate that Bird is judgment-proof and will ignore the injunction 
entered against her (Brief at 8), but they actually have no idea, because 
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Plaintiffs made no enforcement attempts here.  And the Chemerinsky 
Amici overlook the many enforcement remedies available to Plaintiffs.  
Judgment debtors can be compelled to respond in writing and by sworn 
testimony regarding their recoverable assets.  Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 
§§ 708.020, 708.110.  If the judgment debtor is employed, his wages may 
be garnished.  Id. § 706.020, et seq.  If he has non-exempt assets, that car, 
boat or collector’s item may be taken and sold.  Id. § 699.010, et seq.  And 
if he is refuses to comply with a lawful order to remove defamatory 
content—and Yelp allows any user to remove his or her own review 
(A00841)—he can be held in contempt of court.  Cal. Pen. Code § 166.3 
Importantly, Yelp also gives business owners the means to alleviate 
any harm of a critical review by directly responding to that review 
(A00240)—allowing Plaintiffs to inform the public that they obtained a 
defamation judgment and injunction against Bird, or provide any other 
information they deem salient.  California law long has recognized that 
correction of an allegedly false statement provides a meaningful remedy.  
E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 48a (limiting plaintiffs suing media entities to special 
damages where alleged defamatory statement is retracted, or no retraction is 
                                              
3 Yelp does not suggest that Plaintiff now engage in such 
enforcement actions against Bird, having declined to do so for several years 
since the trial court entered its judgment.  Indeed, Bird’s own amicus brief 
demonstrates several reasons why such enforcement might be unjust here, 
including her confirmation that she did not author the J.D. review on Yelp, 
and her assertion that she was never served in the underlying suit.  
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demanded).  See also U.S. v. Alvarez (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2550 (“The 
remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.  This is the ordinary 
course in a free society.”). 
In addition, numerous states (including California) have taken steps 
to combat problems such as revenge porn—a practice not at issue in this 
case—by criminalizing the publication of nude photos without consent.  
E.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 647(j)(4); compare Brief at 6 (citing Citron & 
Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 347 
(2014)).  California law also prohibits stalking, doxing and harassment.  
Cal. Pen. Code §§ 646.9, 653.2; compare Brief at 6-7 (citations omitted). 
The Chemerinsky Amici’s paternalistic suggestion that Yelp will 
benefit from a rule allowing injunctions to be entered against it without 
notice or an opportunity to be heard (Brief at 8-9) also must be flatly 
rejected.  As the Revised Amicus Brief submitted by Prof. Eugene Volokh 
demonstrates—through careful analysis of dozens of examples of fraud and 
litigation abuse designed to silence critics—Internet publishers are harmed 
by judgments like this one, which was entered without protecting the basic 
due process rights of Yelp (or, arguably, defendant Bird).  Volokh Brief, 
passim.  Indeed, Prof. Volokh’s Amicus Brief demonstrates that courts 
must abide by stringent standards in order to protect Internet speech from 
unscrupulous businesses determined to find ways around Section 230 and 
the First Amendment. 
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Yelp is entitled to decide what is best for its website.  Plaintiffs may 
not interfere in those editorial decisions unless they can meet the 
demanding constitutional standards to restrain Yelp’s First Amendment 
rights and overcome the broad protection of Section 230—something 
Plaintiffs did not even attempt here, because they knew they would fail.  
E.g. R.B. at 18-19 & n.3 (discussing constitutional protection for editorial 
decision-making); see A00837.  Yelp does not benefit when courts mandate 
the removal of content without giving online publishers notice or 
opportunity to be heard, but does benefit when courts reject attempts to 
obtain such prior restraints. 
As the Chemerinsky Amici cannot deny, Yelp benefits from a 
website that includes positive and critical reviews of businesses like 
Plaintiffs’ law firm.  Brief at 9.  As Amici The Internet Association and the 
Consumer Technology Association point out, the First Amendment protects 
both the speaker and the audience, ensuring that consumers receive the 
information they need to make informed decisions.  Internet Ass’n Brief at 
17-19.  And as Amici Public Citizen, Inc., and Floor64, Inc., explain, 
because no business asks Yelp to remove positive reviews, Section 230 
“protects the marketplace of ideas from consistent removal of one side of 
the debate and consumers from falsely one-sided portrayals of businesses 
and individuals that may, indeed, merit criticism.”  Public Citizen & 
Floor64 Amicus Brief at 20.  Yelp benefits when consumers know that 
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business owners cannot force the removal of critical reviews based on 
nothing more than an uncontested default judgment (A00211) following 
questionable service attempts on a reviewer (A00026) with no advance 
notice to Yelp (A00243).   
The Chemerinsky Amici’s arguments simply ignore the appellate 
court’s decision, which stripped Yelp of the protections that they recognize 
are fundamental to preserve Yelp’s rights.  Brief at 13.  As the 
Chemerinsky Amici concede, Yelp should have been afforded “an 
opportunity to be heard” to challenge the injunction entered against it on 
the merits.  Id.  It was not.  The appellate court held that Yelp had no basis 
for challenging the underlying injunction against Bird.  Op. at 16-17.4  The 
court expressly found that Yelp was bound by the defamation finding 
against Bird.  Id. at 23.  It held that “Yelp does not have standing to 
challenge” the merits of the Judgment against Bird.  Id. at 26. 
Finally, the Chemerinsky Amici’s suggestion that a nonstatutory 
motion to vacate adequately protects Yelp’s due process rights (Brief at 13) 
ignores the fact that it did not protect Yelp’s rights here.  Yelp brought just 
                                              
4 As Yelp explains in its Reply Brief, the Chemerinsky Amici’s 
suggestion that Yelp’s rights are protected because it can file a motion and 
hope that the court agrees to vacate the injunction after-the-fact flouts due 
process.  R.B. at 30 n.10.  The same could be said about any injunction, yet 
federal and state courts are clear that parties subject to an injunction are 
entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard, either before the 
injunction is entered or promptly afterwards, as a condition to entering the 
injunction.  E.g., O.B. at 19-20; R.B. at 12-13. 
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such a motion, yet the appellate court refused to hear Yelp’s challenge to 
the underlying Judgment (Op. at 16-17, 23, 26), and the trial court used 
Yelp’s arguments against it, concluding that “the facts indicate that Yelp is 
acting on behalf of Bird” because those arguments may have benefitted 
Bird as well as Yelp.  A00809.  Yelp should not have been placed in this 
position.  This Court should reverse the lower courts’ decisions and ensure 
that Internet publishers like Yelp receive the due process protections that 
the Constitution guarantees them. 
B. The Chemerinsky Amicus Brief Would Turn The First 
Amendment On Its Head. 
The Chemerinsky Amici ask this Court to embrace an unprecedented 
and indefensible exception to the long-standing prohibition on injunctions 
enjoining speech.  Compare O.B. at 30-33 with Amicus Brief at 8-10.5  But 
in defending a prior restraint issued against a non-party to the litigation, 
without protecting that non-party’s due process rights, the Chemerinsky 
Amici ignore key constitutional principles.  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
explained that “freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of 
individual liberty—thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the 
common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.”  Bose Corp. 
v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 
                                              
5 Tellingly, the Chemerinsky Amici cite nothing to support their 
claim that “[i]t is black letter law” that statements adjudicated to be 
defamatory can be permanently enjoined as against a non-party.  Brief at 1-
2.  No case supports this remarkable proposition. 
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(1984).  And as Amici Airbnb, Inc., et al., explain, consumer reviews like 
those at issue here—comprised largely of opinions that affect day-to-day 
decision-making about where to spend money—lie at the heart of the First 
Amendment.  Airbnb, Inc., et al., Brief at 26. 
Dean Chemerinsky previously has urged the U.S. Supreme Court to 
hold that the First Amendment prohibits prior restraints as a remedy in a 
defamation proceeding, without exception, explaining that “[t]his is 
especially important here where the criticism was targeted … at lawyers 
and the legal profession, subject matter about which robust debate should 
be encouraged.”  Motion for Judicial Notice (“MJN”) Ex. B at 0106-0107.  
Dean Chemerinsky emphasized there that “[e]ven if, under some limited 
circumstance, injunctions on future speech about private persons could be 
considered consistent with the First Amendment … the paramount 
importance of an open and free discourse regarding public persons imposes 
a constitutional bar on their ability to obtain injunctive relief in the 
defamation context.”  Id.  In the end, “[t]he only way to adequately 
safeguard free expression is to mandate that no kind of civil defamation 
plaintiff may obtain injunctive relief.”  Id. at 43.   
Despite his prescient warnings about the slippery slope risked there, 
Dean Chemerinsky now urges this Court to go much further, and affirm a 
prior restraint against a non-party who had no notice that an order enjoining 
it from publishing speech had been requested.  But the Chemerinsky Amici 
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cannot cite a single case supporting their argument.6  And they ignore the 
constitutional mandate, reaffirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court just over a 
decade ago, that the Constitution forbids any prior restraint that sweeps 
“more broadly than necessary” and “[a]n ‘order’ issued in ‘the area of First 
Amendment rights’ must be ‘precis[e]’ and narrowly ‘tailored’ to achieve 
the ‘pin-pointed objective’ of the ‘needs of the case.’”  Tory v. Cochran 
(2005) 544 U.S. 734, 738-39 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Comm’n on Human Relations (1973) 413 U.S. 376, 390; Carroll v. 
President and Comm’rs of Princess Anne (1968) 393 U.S. 175, 183-84).  
Thus, limits on speech must “burden no more speech than necessary to 
serve a significant government interest.”  Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Center, Inc. (1994) 512 U.S. 753, 765.7 
                                              
6 As Yelp demonstrates in its Merits Briefs, Planned Parenthood 
Golden Gate v. Garibaldi (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 345, 352, actually 
supports Yelp, not Plaintiffs.  O.B. at 23-25; R.B. at 28, 32.  Gottlieb v. 
Kest (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 110, also does not support the Chemerinsky 
Amici’s claims.  That court made clear that collateral estoppel only applies 
where “‘the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party 
or in privity with a party at the prior [proceeding].’”  Id. at 148 (citation 
omitted).  Plaintiffs cannot meet this requirement, and have never tried.  
Finally, the Chemerinsky Amici’s reliance on 5 B.E. Witkin, Summary of 
California Law, Torts § 537 (10th Ed. 2005), is misplaced because Section 
230 immunizes Yelp from any potential liability flowing out of its 
publication of Bird’s consumer review. 
7 See also MJN Ex. B at 0108, citing Board of Airport 
Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. (1987) 482 U.S. 569, 574-75 
(invalidating overbroad regulations prohibiting all “First Amendment 
activities” at airports in Los Angeles); City of Houston, Texas v. Hill (1987) 
482 U.S. 451, 481 (declaring unconstitutional an overbroad provision 
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The Chemerinsky Amici also engage in sleight of hand in discussing 
the issue before the Court.  They argue that “[t]he rules governing default 
judgments” permit enforcement against Yelp.  Amicus Brief at 9.  But those 
rules are irrelevant here.  The well-established principle invoked there—
that someone who has received notice of an action and fully understands 
the ramifications of a default, but nonetheless has chosen not to appear, has 
foregone their right to challenge the result—does not apply here.  E.g., R.B. 
at 14 (discussing Code of Civil Procedure § 580, which satisfies due 
process requirements by ensuring that parties receive adequate notice of the 
relief that will be sought against them in a default judgment). 
Contrary to the claims in the Chemerinsky Amicus Brief, and as 
Dean Chemerinsky has argued to the U.S. Supreme Court, the First 
Amendment flatly prohibits injunctions on speech that extend to non-
parties, without giving those non-parties notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.  See MJN Ex. B at 0100.  There, Dean Chemerinsky argued: 
Just as it is “always difficult to know in advance what an 
individual will say,” … it is also difficult to know in advance 
who will speak.  Any injunction designed to restrict speech 
effectively must encompass others besides the defamation  
defendant, such as Ruth Craft in this case.  But that inevitably 
involves stripping persons not before the court of their First 
Amendment rights without sufficient due process.  
                                                                                                                           
making it unlawful to interrupt police officers in the course of their duties); 
Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim (1981) 452 U.S. 61, 61-62 (striking as 
overbroad an ordinance prohibiting all live entertainment); Gooding v. 
Wilson (1972) 405 U.S. 518 (invalidating a fighting words statute). 
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Id. (citing Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad (1975) 420 U.S. 546, 559; 
Hansberry v. Lee (1940) 311 U.S. 32, 40; Martin v. Wilks (1989) 490 U.S. 
755, 761).  Dean Chemerinsky’s prediction certainly has proven true in this 
case.  As Amicus XCentric Ventures, LLC points out, Yelp alone currently 
is bound by the Injunction, although the statements at issue have been 
repeated many times—including in the court record—evidencing the 
futility of the lower courts’ decisions.  XCentric Brief at 6-9.  When 
Plaintiffs chose to litigate this dispute, they injected all of Bird’s statements 
into the public record, which “may thereafter be freely published online, 
either by courts themselves or by third parties.”  Id. at 9.   
The Chemerinsky Amici’s unprecedented extension of the narrow 
injunctive relief allowed in Balboa Island finds absolutely no support in 
California or federal law.  It would create havoc—inviting forum-shopping 
plaintiffs to pursue in California relief that no other court has allowed—by 
freeing defamation plaintiffs of the constraints mandated by the First 
Amendment.8  It cannot become law in this State. 
                                              
8 Yelp has already fully addressed all of the Chemerinsky Amici’s 
arguments related to 47 U.S.C. § 230.  Chemerinsky Brief at 13-16; see 
O.B. at 36-39, 43-54; R.B. at 34-42.  Thus, while Yelp disputes the 
Chemerinsky Amici’s claims regarding the scope of Section 230, it does 
not respond here by repeating the arguments from its Opening and Reply 
Briefs. 
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